T he decision processes surrounding investments in innovative information technology (IT) platforms are complicated by uncertainty about expected payoffs and irreversibilities in the costs of implementation. When uncertainty and irreversibility are high, concepts from real options should be used to properly structure the evaluation and management of investment opportunities, and thereby capture the value of managerial flexibility. However, while innovation researchers have posited that option value can influence the motivations of early adopters, and options researchers have identified emerging IT as a promising area for application of options valuation techniques, there has yet to be a systematic theoretical integration of work on IT innovation and real options.
Introduction
The pace of change in the information technology (IT) field has been rapid over the past decade, with a host of promising new platform technologies 1 confronting forward-looking organizations. Managers know they must innovate (at least occasionally) to thrive, yet it can be difficult to decide which technologies to adopt, when to adopt them, and how to manage the implementation process to realize business value. 1 An IT platform is broadly defined here as a general-purpose technology that enables a family of applications and related business opportunities. This includes computing platforms (e.g., Palm OS), infrastructure platforms (e.g., wireless networking), software development platforms (e.g., Java), and enterprise application platforms (e.g., ERP). Thus, the term "IT platform" may be viewed as a generalization of the term "software platform" employed by Taudes et al. (2000) .
Much of this difficulty arises from two challenges typically associated with IT platform innovations: uncertainty about the benefits of using the innovation and irreversibility in the costs of deployment. Uncertainty arises both from the unpredictable evolution of the technologies themselves and from strategic path dependencies they impose on a firm's future IT trajectory. Irreversibility arises from high learning and adaptation costs during deployment and high switching costs after deployment.
When uncertainty and irreversibility are high-and when managers have flexibility concerning the timing and structure of technology adoption investmentsit is fruitful to view such investments through a real options lens (Amram and Kulatilaka 1999 , Dixit and Pindyck 1994 , Trigeorgis 1993 . According to this view, initial investments in new IT-such as pilot projects, prototypes, or the first phase in a multiphase implementation-create "growth" options 2 (Taudes 1998) . These options confer the right, but not the obligation, to obtain benefits from future deployments of the technology, just as financial call options confer the right, but not the obligation, to obtain benefits from future ownership of traded securities. Those organizations that simply defer investment in IT platform technologies may not have quite the same claim on future benefits because of time-compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool 1989) .
Viewing technology adoption as an option has a number of implications for IT innovation. One is that organizations will approach the justification process rather differently. Managers will not be satisfied with the common practice of developing a static best estimate of the costs and benefits associated with technology deployment. Instead, they will seek to employ more dynamic valuation methods that properly reflect the value of managerial flexibility in project execution. This could mean estimating a formal options pricing model (OPM), though it is not essential to use such models to bring options thinking into the justification process. Managers can also account for managerial flexibility using decision trees (Hamilton 2000) , qualitative scoring models (McGrath and MacMillian 2000) , or even just better-informed managerial intuition. The key point is to realize that when uncertainty and irreversibility are high, omitting the value of managerial flexibility can lead to substantial understatement of the value of investments in new IT.
Beyond project justification, options thinking has implications for how investments are managed. Firms should be more inclined to initiate uncertain investments in IT because the option value estimate of an uncertain investment always exceeds the static 2 Growth options refer to a situation where early investment is a "prerequisite or a link in a chain of interrelated projects, opening up future growth opportunities" (Trigeorgis 1993, p. 204) . Other kinds of real options are applicable to IT investments, such as options to defer, to change scale, to abandon, or to switch use. For example, Benaroch and Kauffman (1999b) examine the option to defer in the case of Yankee 24's decision on timing of an investment to expand its point-of-sale debit card network. However, this paper will focus on the growth options associated with early investments in IT platforms. net present value (NPV) estimate (and sometimes by quite a wide margin, Taudes et al. 2000) . However, such firms should also be more likely to redirect or terminate uncertain projects, because the options approach assumes that managers can and will "cull" projects when the ball of uncertainty bounces the wrong way. This contrasts with the often observed propensity of managers to escalate commitment to troubled projects (Keil et al. 2000) .
There has been a growing stream of research on IT investments and real options (Benaroch 2002; Benaroch and Kauffman 1999a, 1999b; Clemons 1991; Dos Santos 1991; Kambil et al. 1993; Taudes 1998; Taudes et al. 2000) . In addition, innovation researchers, who have traditionally been interested in how organizational factors (e.g., resources and capabilities) can affect technology adoption, have observed the general link between technology options and the motivations of early adopters (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Fichman and Kemerer 1999) . Nevertheless, there has been no attempt to date to synthesize work on real options and the determinants of technology adoption, even though (as just argued) options represent a superior logic for assessing the value associated with technology adoption. Consequently, the goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of the determinants of option value associated with investments in IT platform innovations.
The proposed model is intended to support a comprehensive examination of a central question in the innovation field: When should a firm take the lead as an innovator with emerging technologies? While some prior research has noted that organizations on the leading edge in adopting highly uncertain new technologies often do so out of (at least implicit) recognition of option value (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) , this insight has not been incorporated in any systematic fashion into prior models of innovation initiation or adoption. The posited model is consistent with much prior work on the question of which firms should lead in innovating, but it also draws attention to some new factors and interaction effects not previously considered in IT innovation research. It also suggests different relationships for some previously considered factors. Although the model can be generalized to other technologies, the focus here is on IT platforms because, as will be argued below, the logic of real options is particularly appropriate for such technologies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. It begins by summarizing the general case for viewing technological innovation in general, and IT platform investments in particular, through the real options lens. Then a set of 12 factors-drawn from 4 complementary perspectives on innovation (technology strategy, organizational learning, innovation bandwagons, and technology adaptation)-is synthesized into a model of the determinants of option value of innovative IT platform investments. Rationales are provided to explain the direct effects of these factors on option value, and selected interactions among the factors are also considered. Finally, the implications of this work for research and practice are offered in three areas: models for predicting early IT platform initiation and adoption, estimating the option value of IT platform investments, and managing IT platform projects.
Early Investments in IT Platform
Innovations 2.1. Real Options Analysis For many years management scholars have argued that we should view uncertain investments in new technology through a real options lens (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Trigeorgis 1993, p. 204) . These researchers have noted the similarity between options on physical assets and the kinds of options created by technology positioning investments (McGrath 1997) . A technology positioning investment is an initial expenditure on a technology (e.g., for R&D) that creates the right, but not the obligation, to obtain the benefits associated with further development and deployment of the technology. This is similar to the structure of a real option, which confers the right, but not the obligation, to obtain the benefits associated with some physical asset.
Firms that make such investments retain full exposure to the upside potential of the technology should subsequent events prove favorable to deployment, but they can limit losses to just the positioning investment if future events prove unfavorable. This asymmetric exposure to gains versus losses has several implications, some of which are counterintuitive. The most immediate counterintuitive implication is that ignoring the effects of this asymmetry (as occurs in traditional NPV calculations) can lead to surprisingly large understatements in the value of the positioning investment, and thus inhibit innovation. Another counterintuitive implication is that the value of a positioning project will increase as the variance of potential net benefits from full deployment increase, even if the expected value of net benefits are held constant. That is, greater uncertainty at the outset of an investment increases the value of an option. Ordinarily, higher uncertainty, if anything, will tend to lower the estimated value of an investment by encouraging use of a higher discount rate.
Three conditions are prerequisite to using real options concepts to structure the evaluation and management of technology investments: uncertainly regarding net payoffs, irreversibility in project costs, and managerial flexibility regarding how projects are structured (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . All three conditions hold strongly for innovative IT platforms. Net payoffs are typically quite uncertain because of a combination of three characteristics that often attend such platforms: high interpretive flexibility (which multiplies the array of feasible implementation configurations and associated values), high knowledge barriers (which make it hard to anticipate the full costs of implementation), and strong positive network externalities (which condition the value of implementation on whether a robust adoption network arises). (The role of these three characteristics in real options analysis is considered in greater detail in §3.)
Regarding the second precondition, the adoption of an innovative IT platform is essentially an investment in a new organizational capability, and such investments are largely irreversible due to the tight coupling of technology and organization (Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001) . While a portion of expenditures for hardware and software can be reversed in some cases, other direct costs associated with organizational learning and adaptation cannot be reversed. These costs, which typically dwarf the out-of-pocket costs of the technology per se, include expenditures for training, hiring experienced workers and consultants, engaging in learning by doing, developing new policies and procedures, establishing supporting infrastructure, and absorbing losses in productivity during the transition from old to new.
Finally, managers have considerable flexibility in how they approach IT platform investments. This flexibility can take two basic forms: flexibility in the process of delivering the new system, and flexibility in the result, i.e., what the system offers for future uses and enhancements. Flexibility in the former is promoted by managerial discretion in how projects are decomposed and staged, while flexibility in the latter is promoted by interpretive flexibility as well as by proactive steps to make systems more generic, multipurpose, interoperable, and scalable.
IT Platform Adoption and Real Options
The options associated with new IT platforms have similarities to those created by R&D (Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza 2003) and can be seen as a specific instance of the general case of technology positioning investments. The innovation process begins with some positioning investment in the platform, which can take the form of a pilot project, prototype, establishment of necessary infrastructure, or some baseline implementation of the platform itself. This initial investment positions the firm to conduct follow-on projects associated with the platform. For example, in the ERP case examined by Taudes et al. (2000) , the positioning investment was the baseline implementation of R/3 from SAP, which opened the door to follow-on projects related to EDI, workflows, and e-commerce. Based on the Black-Scholes OPM, the estimated option value of follow-on projects exceeded the conventional NPV estimates by a factor of four.
While a formal OPM is not needed to apply options thinking, it is often worthwhile to employ such models, especially on major projects or in situations with competing investment scenarios.
3 Beyond the 3 The Black-Scholes OPM calculates option value based on (1) the projected value of the project (assumed to be distributed lognormal and nonnegative), (2) the variability of projected value, (3) the cost of the project (assumed to be known with certainty), (4) the risk-free rate of return, and (5) the time until expiration. Other OPMs have less-stringent assumptions. The multiplicative form of the Cox-Rubenstein Binomial Model allows nonconstant variance, and the additive form of the model also allows project value to be normally distributed with the potential for negative values example described above, OPMs have been applied to investments in decision support systems (Kumar 1999) , telecommunications IT infrastructure (Panayi and Trigeorgis 1998) , ATM banking network infrastructure (Benaroch and Kauffman 1999b) , and objectoriented middleware (Dai et al. 1999) . When using real options to frame the IT platform investment problem, the cost of the initial positioning investment can be seen as the "price" paid to obtain the set of options enabled by the positioning investment. (A deferral option is a special case where the positioning investment cost is zero.) Each follow-on project enabled by the positioning investment is modeled as a separate option. Positioning investments can take two basic forms: provisional adoption initiatives (prototypes or pilot projects) that allow a detailed evaluation of the technology and need not provide lasting benefit in themselves, and larger "baseline" implementations of the full platform. Either way, the total option value of the positioning investment is equal to the sum of the option values of follow-on projects plus the NPV (possibly negative) of the positioning investment. 4 While practical challenges exist in the application of OPMs to IT platform investments, in many cases these challenges will be manageable (Copeland and Tufano 2004) , and where they are not, managers can use other techniques to support options thinking, such as decision tree analysis, qualitative scoring models, or general project management heuristics.
Regardless of the approach used to value real options-and there are many-all are consistent with (Copeland and Antikarov 2001) . Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza (2003) have developed an OPM that explicitly models uncertainty in project costs and allows an additional form of uncertainty, which is the possibility of a catastrophic event during development. In addition, Monte Carlo simulation methods can be used that permit a great deal of flexibility in modeling options (Amram and Kulatilaka 1999, Chapter 8 ). An excellent summary of OPMs and their use on IT investments can be found in Schwartz and ZozayaGorostiza (2003) . The stylized facts are as follows:
(1) There is a wide variance of potential net payoffs resulting from the follow-on project. This follows directly from an assumption of high uncertainty in benefits that underlies the real options approach. Uncertainty in costs, which may or may not be modeled depending on the OPM used, will also generally increase the variance of net payoffs.
5 (This stylized fact is consistent with the traditional DCF view; although in practice managers will usually estimate one deterministic "best guess" scenario when employing DCF analysis.) (2) Exposure to positive and negative payoffs is asymmetric. This follows directly from the assumption of managerial flexibility underlying real options analysis. In particular, it is assumed that managers will have the discretion to refuse to exercise options that are not "in the money," i.e., for which the updated estimates of implementation costs exceed those for the benefits. To put this graphically, it is assumed that managers are only exposed to the payoff region to the right of zero in Figure 1b . (This stylized fact contradicts the DCF view, which assumes all initiated projects are brought to completion, i.e., firms are exposed to the whole payoff region in Figure 1a .) 5 Kumar (1996) has shown that when costs are allowed to vary, an increase in the variance in either benefits or costs can theoretically decrease the overall variance of net payoffs. However, this can only occur when changes to benefits and costs are assumed to be positively correlated. While a positive correlation may seem plausible at first glance, a closer examination reveals that it is unlikely to occur in practice. When one adds the necessary assumption that the scope of a follow-on project is fixed, then there is no reason to assume that upward revisions of costs for a project should be accompanied by upward revisions of estimated benefits. In fact, if anything, one might expect a negative correlation because certain adverse events could simultaneously increase costs and lower benefits (e.g., the adopted platform loses a standards war). The full system costs $10 m to implement and has potential benefits ranging from $0 to 20 m with a resulting PDF of net payoffs below. The expected value of immediate full investment is calculated by multiplying the probability of the true payoff falling within each 1 of the 10 probability bars by the average payoff for the bar, i.e., 0.02 * (-9) + 0.09 * (-7 ) … 0.04 * (+9) = negative $1.1 m. The system is structured as a follow-on project to be completed later (e.g., after a pilot project). If it is assumed managers will know the true payoff at this later time, then the negative net payoff region will be avoided. This leads to a revised estimated payoff of 0.10 * (1)+ 0.08 (3) …+ 0.04 (9) = $1.4 m. This is only an approximation of the value that would be estimated by a formal OPM. 3) The only way to avoid the negative payoff region is to cancel or redirect the follow-on project. This follows directly from the assumption of irreversibility underlying real options analysis, which states that the cost of investment cannot be reversed once incurred. (This stylized fact is not relevant to the traditional DCF view, which assumes initiated projects are always followed to completion.) (4) The value of the option increases with increasing expected value of potential payoffs. An increase in expected value (i.e., a rightward shift of the whole probability density function (PDF) of payoffs in Figures 1a and 1b) increases both the probability of exercise and the expected value if exercised. Because the value of an option value is proportional to the probability of the option being exercised times the value if exercised (see Figure 1b) , an increase in expected value results in an increase in the option value. (This is consistent with the DCF view, where a rightward shift increases the value estimate.) (5) The value of the option increases with increasing variance of potential payoffs. An increase in payoff variance (i.e., a fattening of the tails of the PDF in Figure  1 ), other things being equal, increases the expected value if exercised, which, as previously stated in (4), increases the value of the option. (This contradicts the DCF view in which increasing variance of potential payoffs either has no value or may be penalized through use of a higher discount rate.) (6) Increases in managerial flexibility increase the value of an option. Increases in flexibility ensure that any particular option that exists in principle will be "well formed" in practice-which is taken here to mean that projects can be structured such that managers will find it technically and organizationally feasible to redirect projects or to let options expire as they normatively should. Looking beyond any individual option, increased managerial flexibility will increase the array of potentially valuable options that may be created by any given positioning investment. (This contradicts the DCF view in that flexibility to terminate or redirect a project does not affect the estimated valuation.)
The final three stylized facts are especially notable in that they can be used to identify which determinants of the positioning investments will be especially salient from an options perspective. They also identify the different mechanisms by which those determinants affect option value. On the first point, stylized facts (5) and (6) suggest that determinants that increase uncertainty and/or increase managerial flexibility will be especially salient, because uncertainty and flexibility affect the traditional and real options estimates of value in different ways (as just described). On the second point, stylized facts (4), (5), and (6) suggest that any determinant that increases the expected value of potential payoffs, increases the variance of payoffs, or increases in managerial flexibility will increase the real options estimate of value. While increases in expected value and variance serve to increase the value of a "well-formed" option, managerial flexibility impoves the odds that a particular option will be "well formed" and also enlarges the set of potentially valuable options.
A Model of Option Value in IT Platform Investments
This section presents a model of the determinants of option value in innovative IT platform investments. It is argued that firms that recognize the potential option value for IT platforms will be more likely to initiate adoption of those platforms through technology positioning investments. Thus, the model creates a synthesis of work on real options and technology adoption.
To identify potential determinants of option value, I considered four complimentary perspectives on organizational innovation, labeled here as (1) technology strategy, (2) organizational learning, (3) innovation bandwagons, and (4) technology adaptation. These perspectives, while not exhaustive, 6 span a large portion of the relevant literature. Within each perspective I sought to identify factors that have an especially significant effect on the variance of returns or managerial flexibility-and thus (as explained in the previous section) may affect option estimates of value differently from traditional assessments of value. The resulting model incorporates a dozen broad determinants, as depicted in Figure 2 and 6 Two notable perspectives that were excluded are the institutional view of innovation (e.g., Abrahamson 1996, DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and the large stream of research on the generic properties of organizations that make them more or less innovative (size, formalization, centralization, etc.). The former perspective was excluded because the focus here is on economic drivers of innovation. As McGrath et al. note, "The options lens embeds a logic for anticipating whether [firm behavior] makes economic sense or not" (2004, p. 98) . The latter perspective was excluded because the model seeks to understand the drivers for adoption of a particular IT platform. Table 1 . Given the historical fragmentation of research on organizational innovation, there is value in synthesizing elements from four important streams into a unified model that applies to a large class of information technologies. However, the proposed model is not just a superset of factors previously considered in prior innovation research. Rather, it emphasizes factors that have a clear economic interpretation from a real options perspective and excludes other factors that do not.
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Option value is placed as a mediating variable leading to adoption because managers are posited to take into account the economic value of initial adoptionwhich is best captured by the real options valuation 7 A few prominent examples of excluded variables are those associated with the management team (top management support, presence of a champion), communication-related variables (e.g., investments in communication channels), and organizationalstructure-related variables (e.g., centralization, formalization). logic-when making investment decisions. This leads to an initial proposition:
Proposition 0. Increased option value will increase the propensity of firms to make positioning investments that support the initial adoption of IT platforms.
Prior studies within the four perspectives vary in how explicitly they consider economic considerations in theorizing. Rationales will often be articulated in terms of the effects of determinants on costs and benefits or the probability of success. The implication, often left unstated, is that some adopters will have higher expected returns from adoption than others. Such rationales are therefore consistent with the DCF or informal cost-benefit approaches to valuation commonly employed. In the proposed model, the economic logic for these variables is made explicit and expanded to include options. The option value logic overlaps with the implicit DCF logic of prior innovation models when considering the expected value of 
Strategic importance of affected products or processes
The extent to which products or processes potentially improved by the innovation are central to the competitive position or value proposition of the firm + +
Sustainability of competitive advantage
The extent to which expected improvements to a firm's strategically important products or products resist rapid duplication by competitors
Innovative capabilities and endowments
The extent to which an organization possesses resources (human, technical, organizational) conducive to effective deployment of the innovation
Knowledge barriers
The extent of the burden of organizational learning associated with adoption
Learning-related endowments
The extent to which an organization possesses knowledge, skills, routines, incentives, and other resources conducive to effective organizational learning surrounding the innovation
Contributions to exploitable absorptive capacity
The extent to which knowledge to be gained during deployment contributes to absorptive capacity in domains with long-lasting strategic relevance + +
Susceptibility to network externalities
The extent to which a technology increases in value to individual adopters with the size of the adoption network
Prospects for network dominance of the technology class
The extent to which the innovation's technology class is likely to achieve a dominant position relative to competing technology classes + + +
Prospects for network dominance of the technology instance
The extent to which the technology instance being adopted is likely to achieve a dominant position relative to competing technology instances within the same class
11. Interpretive flexibility The extent to which a technology permits multiple interpretations on the part of adopters about how it should be implemented and used
Divisibility
The extent to which a technology can be divided for sequential implementation in such a way that each incremental segment positions the firm for a positive payoff, even if no further implementation segments are pursued + + ++ + * The presence of multiple plus signs indicates the presence of more than one intermediate mechanism promoting higher option value.
investments, but differs when considering the contribution to payoffs from variability of returns and managerial flexibility. Thus, as will be discussed later, the magnitude of posited effects for included variablesand in a few cases, the direction of effects-is different owing to the options perspective. Also, the model suggests some variables and interaction effects that have not been previously studied in the IT context.
Of the 12 determinants in the model, 7 (radicalness, knowledge barriers, susceptibility to network externalities, prospects for dominance of the technology class and instance, interpretive flexibility, and divisibility) should be viewed as characteristics of the technology context surrounding a particular adoption opportunity, while the remaining five are characteristics of the organizational context. The characteristics of the technology context can be viewed as either invariant across organizations (if they are defined by how the average or typical adopting organization would experience the characteristic 8 ) or as varying across organizations (if defined by how a particular organization would perceive or experience the characteristic) (see Fichman 2000 for a more detailed discussion). Thus, these factors can be measured either at the level of the technology or at the level of the technology-organization combination, depending on the objectives and design of the research. The organizational factors all vary, depending on the specific technology in question, and thus should be measured at the technology-organization combination.
In the rationales presented below, a determinant will be considered to increase option value if it tends to increase the expected value of potential returns, increase the variance of potential returns, or increase managerial flexibility in the structuring/exercise of options (as per stylized facts (4)-(6) presented in the prior section). Thus, the options approach is similar to traditional DCF-oriented valuation heuristics regarding factors that increase the expected value of returns, but differs by assigning a positive role to increases in variance of returns and managerial flexibility. Table 1 provides a summary of the posited effects of each determinant and a comparison of the overall impact from the options perspective versus the DCF perspective.
Technology Strategy Perspective
A large body of literature has looked at innovation as a strategic move intended to build or reinforce the competitive advantages of the firm (see Afuah 1998 , Chapter 2, for a concise review of this research). Traditionally, this literature has taken a 8 Prior work suggests multiple tactics for measuring characteristics at the level of the technology. Meyer and Goes (1988) used an expert panel of medical college faculty to rate each of 10 innovations in medical technology on observability, the level of risk, and the degree of specialized skill required. Dewar and Dutton (1986) used the average of perceptions of respondents in a survey sample to measure radicalness of a set of six footwear industry innovations on a continuous scale. Ettlie et al. (1984) relied on their own judgments to classify a set of six food-packaging innovations as either radical or incremental. more structural view of which features of technologies and organizations are most important. Regarding technology characteristics, the most frequently made distinction is whether the innovation is radical or incremental (Damanpour 1988 , Dewar and Dutton 1986 , Ettlie et al. 1984 .
9 With regard to organizational characteristics, research has examined the role of many variables-size, structure, culture, staff expertise, slack resources, etc.-in facilitating or hindering innovation (see Damanpour 1991 and Wolfe 1994 for reviews).
More recently, the technology strategy perspective has been increasingly guided by the resource-based view of the firm, which is primarily concerned with understanding the conditions that lead to sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991 , Wernerfelt 1984 . According to this view, a resource will contribute to sustained advantage only if it is valuable, heterogeneously distributed among firms, and immobile. Because the third criterion is the least straightforward of the three, it has received the most attention. Mata et al. (1995) suggest that resources will be more immobile when they are tied to a firm's unique position in history, are difficult to observe due to causal ambiguity, or are difficult to observe and enact due to social complexity. As a result, the resource-based view emphasizes unique resources and contextual conditions, rather than the more generic firm characteristics considered in the prior strategy literature. Relatedly, path dependencies resulting from prior learning, investment, and experience will give firms preferential advantages in exploiting real options and thereby magnify option value (Sambamurthy et al. 2003) .
A review of the technology strategy literature yielded a set of four broad factors that have especially significant effects on uncertainty or flexibility, and hence are especially salient from the options perspective: (1) the radicalness of the technology, (2) the strategic importance of affected products or processes, (3) the sustainability of advantages conferred by improvements in these products or processes, and (4) the extent to which the firm possesses innovative capabilities and endowments consistent with adoption of IT platforms.
3.1.1. Radicalness. The incremental versus radical distinction has long been a central one in the innovation field. This distinction is important in its own right and tends to correlate with other key distinctions (i.e., both disruptive and competency-destroying innovations tend to be more radical). Radicalness can be defined in terms of the outcome of innovation or the process of innovation. Economists focus on outcomes and define an innovation as radical when it reduces the cost of production so far that it makes the methods employed by incumbent firms obsolete (Henderson 1993) . Foster (1986) also focuses on outcomes and defines a radical innovation as one that implies a switch to a new improvement S-curve.
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Consistent with these outcome-oriented approaches, radicalness is defined here as the extent of potential improvements in organizational products or processes enabled by the technology platform.
The effects of radicalness on the expected value of returns from innovation is unclear because the potentially greater returns are offset by correspondingly greater expenses. That is, technologies that enable more radical improvements typically require more substantial complementary changes to organizational structures, routines, and policies. On the other hand, increased radicalness clearly magnifies the uncertainty of early investments in IT platforms and, correspondingly, the variance of potential payoffs. More radical innovations tend to replace, rather than build on, existing technologies and can have wide-ranging effects on the structure of businesses or even entire industries, both intended and unintended (Henderson and Clark 1990) . Innovations with incremental impacts, by contrast, tend to be more localized, to build on existing technologies and competencies, and to have better-defined potential consequences, all of which leads to comparatively lower variance of outcomes. The above arguments result in the following proposition: Proposition 1.1. Increasing radicalness increases the variance of potential returns and thus increases the option value of positioning investments in IT platforms.
3.1.2. Strategic Importance of Affected Products or Processes. Organizations adopt new platforms to facilitate the delivery of new applications, which, in turn are intended to improve the products or processes of the firm. The strategic importance of affected products or processes is defined here as the extent to which the products or processes potentially improved by the innovation are central to the competitive position or value proposition of the firm. This will have a considerable impact on the option value of a proposed investment. Which processes and products are central will vary depending on a firm's generic strategies (operational effectiveness, strategic positioning) and the specifics of its product offerings, customer needs, and competitive environment.
Because, in the end, it is a firm's degree of value added that leads to profits (Porter 2001) , it can be expected that a platform that affects the most strategically important products or processes will produce a greater opportunity for outsized economic rents than one that primarily affects low valued added or support processes. This is especially true with regard to early investments because the extra advantage of being a first mover or a fast follower with respect to new products can translate into much greater market share and profits flowing from the product (Kessler and Chakrabarti 1996, Lieberman and Montgomery 1988) . On the other hand, when a strategic initiative goes awry, costs can be especially heavy. For example, Federal Express lost hundreds of millions of dollars in a failed attempt to introduce ZapMail, a new platform for high-quality facsimile transmittal (Kemerer and Sosa 1991) .
As was the case with radicalness, the effect of strategic importance on the expected value of returns is unclear. Such initiatives tend to have a greater potential value but also to cost more, and there is no obvious rationale for why either effect would systematically predominate. However, by magnifying the range of net payoffs in both the positive and negative directions, increased strategic importance can be expected to dramatically increase the variance of potential returns, leading to the following proposition: Proposition 1.2. Increasing the strategic importance of affected products or processes increases the variance of potential returns and thus increases the option value of positioning investments in IT platforms.
Sustainability of Competitive Advantage.
When a new IT platform provides the opportunity for advantage in strategically important areas, a closely related issue is the sustainability of those advantages. Sustainability is defined here as the extent to which expected improvements to a firm's strategically important products or processes resist rapid duplication by competitors. According to the resourcebased view of the firm, a nonproprietary innovation will only produce sustainable advantage when combined with some distinctive and difficult-to-copy assets (Barney 1991) . This is especially true with IT platform innovations because they are commercially supplied and thus available to all (Bharadwaj 2000 , Kayworth et al. 2001 , Mata et al. 1995 . These distinctive assets can include proprietary products, strong brands, a particularly skilled workforce, or a unique value chain. For example, at Dell Computer the benefits flowing from investments in innovative IT have been sustained in part due to Dell's uniquely configured value chain (Magretta 1998 , Porter 2001 . Likewise, due to its leadership position in ATM infrastructure in New England, Yankee 24 had an unmatched opportunity to rapidly deploy a new line of POS debit cards (Benaroch and Kauffman 1999b) . Other factors that increase the sustainability of advantage associated with product innovations and hence option value include high-entry barriers and switching costs (McGrath 1997) and the potential to produce lock-out through positive feedback loops in adoption (Schilling 1998) . For example, eBay's success in maintaining total dominance in online auctions in the United States, even in the face of well-financed attempts at market entry by leading companies like Yahoo and Microsoft, provides a clear example of lock-out.
An investment that can produce a more sustainable advantage will be more valuable than an improvement that can easily be copied or otherwise matched because a sustainable advantage will lead to a stream of rents with a longer duration (McGrath 1997 ). This will lead to an increase in the expected value of potential returns. However, high sustainability should also increase the variance of returns, as it creates an openended stream of excess rents that will tend to persist until some major technological discontinuity occurs. Because the duration until the emergence of a discontinuity is highly unpredictable, contributions to value from sustainability should also be highly variable. 
Innovative Capabilities and Endowments.
Firms vary greatly in terms of the innovation-related capabilities and endowments they bring to the table when considering an IT platform investment. Pertinent capabilities and endowments include supportive senior management, effective innovation sponsors and champions, access to key resources (technological, financial, managerial), an innovation-oriented culture, and a staff with prior experience and success in the process of innovation itself (Rogers 1995 , Tornatzky and Fleischer 1990 , Wolfe 1994 . Firms that possess such endowments can innovate more economically and with greater probability of success, and this should increase the expected value of returns from investment. For example, Microsoft is well known for its success in leveraging unparalleled financial resources, brand, and dominant positions in key existing platforms (e.g., operating systems) to establish strong positions with respect to adjacent emerging platforms (e.g., databases, office suites, browsers).
It may also be argued that organizations possessing such endowments will have a greater ability to recognize and exploit a larger array of immediate followon projects. For example, organizations with greater innovation experience may have more effective routines in place for scanning and evaluating opportunities. An increased ability to recognize and exploit follow-on projects serves to increase managerial flexibility in the structuring and executing of options associated with the positioning investment.
Proposition 1.4. Increases in innovation capabilities and endowments increase the expected value of potential returns and the level of managerial flexibility and thus increase the option value of positioning investments in IT platforms.

Organizational Learning Perspective
Many scholars have noted the intimate relationship between organizational learning and technological innovation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990 , Kogut and Zander 1992 , Leonard-Barton 1988a , Pennings and Harianto 1992 . At any particular time an organization possesses some bundle of skills and routines (Nelson and Winter 1982) , and the process of technology innovation can be seen as the means by which an organization moves from one bundle to the next. Not surprisingly then, the organizational learning perspective has inspired several studies of IT adoption and assimilation (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999 , Boynton et al. 1994 , Fichman and Kemerer 1997 , Purvis et al. 2001 .
A review of the literature yielded three factors from this domain that have especially significant effects on the variance of expected returns or managerial flexibility: the extent of knowledge barriers imposed by the platform, the degree of learning-related endowments enjoyed by the organization, and the extent to which adoption increases the exploitable absorptive capacity of the firm.
3.2.1. Knowledge Barriers. In a seminal article, Attewell (1992) introduced the concept of knowledge barriers, defined here as the extent of the burden of organizational learning associated with adoption.
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Attewell argued that the adoption of complex organizational technologies should be viewed as a special category of innovation because of the special burden of organizational learning they impose on adopters. He notes that the know-how and technical knowledge associated with such technologies is tacit and relatively immobile, and has to be recreated by users via the processes of learning by doing (among producers) and learning by using (among adopters). Others have made similar distinctions between classes of 11 Some researchers have virtually equated radicalness with the amount of learning required Kulatilaka 2001, Rogers 1995) . However, for this analysis I treat knowledge barriers as conceptually distinct. It is quite possible for a technology to be difficult to understand and use, but to still have incremental (i.e., fairly modest and localized) effects on performance. Preserving this distinction allows insights not immediately apparent from the property of radicalness as I have defined it. knowledge. Von Hippel (1994) asserts that the knowledge used in technical problem solving is "sticky," i.e., costly to acquire, transfer, and use in a new location. Badaracco (1991) distinguishes "migratory knowledge," which can be transferred via books, formulas, and machines, from "embedded knowledge," such as individual craftsmanship, know-how, and team-based knowledge. This distinction between classes of knowledge is crucial: If the knowledge needed to use complex technologies were not "tacit," "sticky," and "embedded," then it could be readily bundled with the artifacts embodying the innovation and incorporated into the purchase price.
Other things being equal, higher knowledge barriers should substantially increase the costs of followon projects enabled by positioning investments, and this serves to lower the expected value of potential returns. In addition, because of high knowledge barriers, early adopters may find it difficult to judge whether successful implementation is well within their organizational capabilities, or exceeds those capabilities. This increases the chance of major implementation fiascoes and ensuing large operational losses, such as those experienced by FoxMeyer (Bulkeley 1996) and Hershey Foods (Stedman 1999) in the wake of ill-fated ERP implementation projects. This, too, should lower the expected value of returns.
On the other hand, knowledge barriers, by their very nature, make it difficult to anticipate the full costs and benefits of IT platform adoption, and this magnifies uncertainty about the net payoffs flowing from early investment. This serves to increase the variance of potential returns. Thus knowledge barriers, by lowering the expected value of returns but increasing their variance, have an unclear overall effect on option value-Although on an intuitive level it seems likely that the former effect will usually dominate the latter. effort. These endowments include a capable and technologically up-to-date staff, a large base of application opportunities over which to amortize learning costs, a high degree of knowledge and skill in the vicinity of the new technology, a wide diversity of knowledge, and the adoption of principles consistent with learning organizations (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999 , Fichman and Kemerer 1997 , Purvis et al. 2001 , Swanson 1994 . Learning-related endowments are defined here as the extent to which an organization possesses knowledge, skills, routines, incentives, and other resources conducive to effective organizational learning surrounding the innovation.
As with innovation-related endowments discussed above, firms that possess greater learning-related endowments can innovate more economically and with a greater probability of success. More specifically, increased endowments will tend to lower the costs of platform implementations, which serves to increase the expected value of payoffs (Fichman and Kemerer 1997) . High endowments (especially those that promote greater absorptive capacity) should also increase the ability of an organization to recognize and exploit a larger array of follow-on projects (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Zahra and George 2002) , and should therefore serve to increase managerial flexibility in the structuring and execution of options associated with the positioning investment.
Proposition 2.2. Increases in learning-related endowments increase the expected value of potential returns and the level of managerial flexibility and thus increase the option value of positioning investments in IT platforms.
Contributions to Exploitable Absorptive
Capacity. As Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue in their work on innovation and organizational learning, innovative activities (such as R&D) produce two outputs: the intended results of the effort itself and a more indirect benefit stemming from increases in the absorptive capacities of the firm. Schilling (1998, p. 272 ) expands on this argument, noting that "through investment in technology development and its associated learning, firms both expand their knowledge and skill base (or core capabilities) and improve their ability to assimilate and utilize future information (their absorptive capacity)."
The value of increased absorptive capacity depends largely on the likelihood that future technological developments will occur in the vicinity of the absorptive capacity being acquired today because this increases the managerial opportunities and associated flexibility to actually exercise the options enabled by increased absorptive capacity. Thus, what matters most in terms of increasing managerial flexibility is the degree of exploitable absorptive capacity, defined here as the extent to which knowledge to be gained during deployment contributes to absorptive capacity in domains with long-lasting strategic relevance. When managers have greater flexibility in options recognition and execution, this will increase option value, leading to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3. Increases in exploitable absorptive capacity increase managerial flexibility to pursue currently unforeseen follow-on investments and thus increase the option value of positioning investments in IT platforms.
Despite considerable attention to absorptive capacity in the management literature (Zahra and George 2002) , it appears that no prior work has addressed the issue of exploitability defined here. Nevertheless, it is possible to develop a sense for when an innovation is part of a broad and lasting trend, even though the specific form of the trend is uncertain, as is the optimal timing for adoption. For example, in the early 1980s some telecommunications companies began laying fiber-optic cables. Although there was much uncertainty about whether these investments were being made at the right time, there was no doubt that the future of high-capacity transmission was fiber, given the substantial inherent advantages over copper wire and the rapid improvement of the technology. Likewise, while there was much doubt in the late 1980s about the immediate payoffs from early investments in client server technologies (C/S) and graphical user interfaces (GUIs), it was clear that these technologies were destined to eventually become standard elements of modern information systems. A few years later, firms with C/S and GUI experience were better positioned to adopt object technology, which diffused in a cluster of technologies that incorporated C/S and GUI elements (Fichman and Kemerer 1997) . When managers have confidence that the nature of uncertainty is when an emerging innovation will dominate rather than whether it will dominate, this suggests higher exploitability of absorptive capacity acquired from early investment.
Technology Bandwagon Perspective
The diffusion patterns of many technologies follow a bandwagon dynamic where adoption begets more adoption, leading to a self-reinforcing pattern of diffusion. This self-reinforcing pattern can arise from instrumental effects, such as those associated with positive network externalities, and also from noninstrumental effects, such as from institutional pressures or the forces of fad and fashion (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993) . Here I focus on the former, as the posited model is concerned with economic drivers of investment in new technology.
One of the key characteristics of technology bandwagons is a tendency toward extreme diffusion outcomes. When a critical mass of adoption is reached, a sustained bandwagon and a tendency toward "winner takes all" are created (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997, Shapiro and Varian 1998) . Alternatively, if a critical mass fails to develop, or if it develops around a different platform, the result is a "stranded" technology (Farrell and Saloner 1985) . This all-or-nothing dynamic plays out at the level of the technology and may also occur within firms (Cool et al. 1997 , Markus 1987 . The tendency toward extreme outcomes magnifies the uncertainty faced by any particular adopter. Thus, the bandwagon perspective is particularly salient for options analysis.
An examination of the literature yielded three important factors from this perspective: susceptibility to network externalities, prospects for dominance of the emergent adoption network surrounding the technology class, and prospects for dominance of the adoption network surrounding the technology instance.
3.3.1. Susceptibility to Positive Network Externalities. Technologies that increase in value to any particular adopter in proportion to the size of the adoption network possess positive network externalities in adoption (Arthur 1988 , Farrell and Saloner 1987 , Katz and Shapiro 1986 , Schilling 1998 , Shapiro and Varian 1998 .
12 While all IT platforms possess network externalities to some extent, this varies across technologies. Thus, the more relevant issue is the degree of susceptibility to network externalities, defined here as the extent to which a technology increases in value to individual adopters with the size of the adoption network.
The susceptibility of an IT platform to network externalities depends on the particular features of the technology and its diffusion context. More specifically, this susceptibility is determined by the presence of the following: (1) scale economies in development and production among suppliers, (2) learning by doing among suppliers, (3) learning by using among adopters, (4) knowledge sharing among suppliers and adopters, (5) technological interrelatedness (and associated infrastructure support), and (6) network externalities arising from the exchange of information and assets conforming to standards embedded in the platform (Arthur 1988 , Schilling 1998 , Shapiro and Varian 1998 .
When a technology is more susceptible to network externalities, uncertainty and the resulting variance of potential returns are magnified in two ways. First, the ultimate benefits of adoption will be determined less by the technology as it is in its early incarnations and more by the technology as it will become. Early adopters are in a sense boarding a train to a destination where it is not known how far or how fast the train will go. Second, increasing susceptibility to network externalities increases the probability that the technology will follow the bandwagon pattern of extreme outcomes. This further increases the variance of potential returns. Increased susceptibility to network externalities also increases the value to be derived from network benefits, and this should increase the expected value of payoffs. 12 The impact of network externalities on technology adoption and diffusion has been examined for a variety of technologies, including spreadsheets (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1997) , ATM networks (Dos Santos and Peffers 1995), web servers (Gallaugher and Wang 2002) , and electronic telephone switches (Cool et al. 1997) . Although strictly speaking positive network externalities represent just one of many contributions to the more general property of increasing returns to adoption (Arthur 1988 ), I will treat the term as being inclusive of all forms of increasing returns. Prospects for network dominance of the technology class is defined here as the extent to which the innovation's technology class is likely to achieve a dominant position relative to competing technology classes. This contrasts with dominance pertaining to the specific platform instance, i.e., the technology product (and associated standard) being adopted (see below). Dominance at the level of a class matters because some network benefits (benefits that flow from the size of the adoption network) occur at this level. The robust adoption of PC platforms, for example, has lowered the cost and increased the variety of related components and peripherals for all platforms, not just those based on the dominant one (Microsoft Windows). Furthermore, dominance of the technology class is required for any particular instance to achieve mass-market dominance. In evaluating the prospects for dominance of a technology class, favorable elements include the absence of a strong installed base for a competing technology class, strong sponsorship, progress in standardization, and heterogeneity of needs in the adopter population (Christensen 1994 , Farrell and Saloner 1985 , Katz and Shapiro 1986 , King et al. 1994 .
All classes of IT platforms possess at least some susceptibility to network externalities. As a result, by increasing the value of network benefits, increased prospects for network dominance will positively affect the expected value of payoffs enabled by positioning investments. By contrast, increasing the prospects for dominance should have no systematic effect on the variance of returns; rather, this should just produce a rightward shift in the whole payoff region. These arguments lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. Increased prospects for dominance of the IT platform class increase the expected value of potential returns and thus increase the option value of positioning investments in the IT platform.
Network Dominance of the Technology
Instance. Prospects for network dominance of the technology instance is defined here as the extent to which the technology instance being adopted is likely to achieve a dominant position relative to competing technology instances within the same class. Even when a technology class is destined for robust adoption, this does not ensure that a particular standard embodying the technology will develop a strong following. In fact, the markets for network goods are often "tippy," with one standard eventually taking a dominant share of the market (Arthur 1988, Shapiro and Varian 1998) . IT products are especially prone to these outcomes, as evidenced by the commanding positions of market leaders in such areas as microprocessors, operating systems, office automation suites, Internet browsers, Internet routers, and databases. Being stranded with a losing technology product can be quite detrimental because many network benefits accrue at the level of the product. Also, it is usually difficult to change from one product to another due to product-specific investments and other switching costs. Shapiro and Varian (1998) have identified several key assets that position a technology vendor to win a standards competition within a product class: control over an installed base, intellectual property rights, ability to innovate, first mover advantages, manufacturing capabilities, strength in complements, and brand name and reputation. While this model is directed at technology developers, it nevertheless provides adopters a means to assess different technology instances. The implication is that products rating highly on these criteria will be more likely to win a standards competition and go on to dominance.
Because all IT platform product instances possess some susceptibility to network externalities, the value of using the platform will be tied to the fate of that product. In particular, as prospects for network dominance increase, the value of network benefits, and so the overall expected value in investing in the platform, will likewise increase. However, as before with the technology class, increasing prospects for dominance of the instance should have little or no effect on variance of payoffs. This leads to the following proposition: 
Technology Adaptation Perspective
Adaptation plays a central role in the implementation of advanced IT. As Tyre and Orlikowski (1993) note, "The full advantages of such technologies cannot simply be purchased off the shelf; they are won by patiently and carefully tailoring the technology to fit a given firm's organizational and strategic context. At the same time, organizational skills, procedures, and assumptions within the firm need to be adapted to fit the new technology" (p. 13). Not surprisingly then, a large body of work has examined adaptation processes during technology implementation and use (DeSanctis and Poole 1994; Leonard-Barton 1988a; Orlikowski 1996 Orlikowski , 2000 Rice and Rogers 1980; Tyre and Orlikowski 1994) .
While there is much diversity in this research, there is also agreement on several key points:
(1) Adaptation is possible due to the interpretative flexibility (Orlikowski 1996) of modern IT systems and the discretion this affords organizations to appropriate (DeSanctis and Poole 1994) the same technology in different ways.
(2) Adaptation is necessary due to "misfits" between what the technology does "out of the box" and the current and/or desired future state of the receiving organization (Leonard-Barton 1988a).
(3) The full array of needs and opportunities to adapt technology cannot be predicted in advance but rather emerge during implementation itself (Orlikowski 1996) .
(4) The inherent unpredictability of this emergent process suggests the need for more fluid or even improvisational (Orlikowski 2000) approaches to implementation.
It is somewhat ironic that while the technology adaptation perspective has traditionally been the least quantitative or economically minded of the four considered here, its assumptions about how organizations do (or should) innovate is perhaps the most well aligned with options thinking. This perspective suggests two factors that are particularly salient from an options standpoint, in that they increase uncertainty about payoffs and managerial flexibility: interpretive flexibility and divisibility.
3.4.1. Interpretive Flexibility. Interpretive flexibility is defined here as the extent to which a technology permits multiple interpretations on the part of adopters about how it should be implemented and used (Orlikowski 1996) . Interpretive flexibility allows organizations greater discretion in how they chose to appropriate a technology and adapt it over time (DeSanctis and Poole 1994); virtually by definition this promotes managerial flexibility in the structuring and execution of options.
The raison d'être of IT platforms is to support a wide array of possible configurations and associated applications, and so they tend to be tailorable, open-ended tools (Orlikowski 1992 (Orlikowski , 1996 . However, this is more true for some platforms than others. An expert system shell, for example, might be viewed as less tailorable because it can only be used to develop expert systems, while groupware tools can be viewed as highly tailorable. Even within a technology class some products will be more or less restrictive than others in what they allow adopters to accomplish (DeSanctis and Poole 1994) .
High interpretive flexibility serves to increase managerial flexibility in how adoption projects are structured by enabling a larger set of feasible implementation configurations. This greater set of configurations also means greater uncertainty and a corresponding increase in variance in the distribution of potential payoffs from adoption, because it cannot be known in advance which configurations will be optimal. For example, Orlikowski (1996) documents a groupware implementation that evolved from a tool intended to record information about helpdesk incident reports into one that played important, unanticipated roles in new employee training, worker evaluations, and the distribution of work among call specialists. By increasing the set of possible implementation configurations, greater interpretive flexibility should also increase the opportunity to pursue a more incremental investment strategy. As will be explained in the following section, increased incrementalism tends to increase the expected value of potential returns and also managerial flexibility. 3.4.2. Divisibility. A technology is divisible to the extent that it can be divided up for sequential implementation in such a way that each incremental segment positions the firm for a positive payoff even if no further implementation segments are pursued (Leonard-Barton 1988b) . Divisibility, then, is a key enabler of incremental implementation, 13 which lies at the heart of the options view (Bowman and Hurry 1993) .
Increased incrementalism serves to enhance managerial flexibility in options execution because at the end of each incremental segment, managers will have a fresh opportunity to consider which options are available, which should be retained, and which should be discarded in ensuing segments. Because managers will have acquired new knowledge in situ in prior segments, they will be better equipped to make informed choices about which options to pursue in subsequent segments.
Incremental implementation has been associated with better outcomes in a variety of domains, including strategic decision making in high-velocity environments (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988) , implementation of organizational innovations (Leonard-Barton 1988b) , and implementation of software packages (Fichman and Moses 1999) . Thus, incrementalism should also promote increases in the expected value of returns from IT positioning investments. 
Interaction Effects
While space limitations do not permit a detailed examination of interaction effects among the 12 determinants of option value, it seems likely that several such interactions will exist. The points below are tentative rationales that support some of more likely 13 An incremental approach to implementation is not to be confused with incremental versus radical results. Radical changes can be enacted through a sequence of incremental steps (Orlikowski 1993). interactions:
• Radicalness goes to the magnitude of improvements, while strategic importance goes to the leveragability of any given improvement in terms of producing actual rents. Therefore, these variables should have a multiplicative effect. A similarly structured argument can be made to posit a multiplicative relationship between radicalness and sustainability of competitive advantage.
• Innovation-related capabilities and endowments arguably become even more important for radical innovations because such innovations impose greater implementation challenges (Dewar and Dutton 1986, Ettlie et al. 1984) . Thus, an interaction between radicalness and innovation-related endowments seems likely. A similar argument can be used to posit an interaction between knowledge barriers and learningrelated endowments.
• When network externalities are strong, network benefits will comprise a higher portion of the total benefits associated with adoption. Because network benefits represent additional value beyond intrinsic benefits (which occur regardless of whether others adopt), higher susceptibility to network benefits will have a multiplicative effect on the benefits produced by dominance of the technology class. A similar argument can be made for an interaction effect with dominance of the technology instance.
• When interpretive flexibility is high, this creates the opportunity for managers to appropriate a technology in a way that is most suited to their organizational specifics, and this should create additional opportunities to leverage any distinctive and hardto-copy complementary assets that might exist. This should increase the sustainability of rents flowing from IT platform adoption, which suggests that interpretive flexibility may have a multiplicative relationship with sustainability of competitive advantage.
As these posited effects are tentative, it is suggested that close consideration of potential interactions be considered in empirical work based on the proposed model. In addition, there may be other relationships among the antecedents beyond interaction effects that warrant modeling. For example, it might be argued that interpretive flexibility and strategic importance directly promote greater sustainability of rents.
Implications and Future Work
This article has developed the case for viewing early investments in IT platforms through the real options lens and has identified 12 key factors that determine the option value of IT platform investments. The central implications are that IT platform adoption is best managed as an option and that firms that recognize option value and manage platforms investments according to the logic of real options will have improved returns to innovation.
IT Innovation Initiation and Adoption
The model addresses a central question in the innovation field: Under what circumstances should a firm take the lead as an innovator with emerging technologies? Somewhat surprisingly, no prior attempt has been made to give a comprehensive answer to this question in the IT context (or complex organizational technologies more generally). This question could be analyzed using a traditional DCF logic, but adopting an options perspective gives a richer and more accurate analysis, in that it both encompasses and expands on the DCF logic.
The model synthesizes work from four different streams of research (technology strategy, organizational learning, innovation bandwagons, and technology adaptation) using a common economic perspective. In so doing, the model has highlighted some factors-susceptibility to network externalities, interpretive flexibility, and divisibility-that have not been examined as innovation antecedents in prior empirical research. The model also posits several interaction effects that have not been previously considered in IT research.
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The predictions of the model do overlap in many areas with those suggested by a traditional DCF approach. Eight of the factors increase the expected value of projected returns, which increases the attractiveness of innovation under both the traditional DCF 14 However, some early work in the innovation field employed radicalness as a moderator (e.g., Dewar and Dutton 1986) . Also, some recent IT studies have an embedded assumption that such moderating relationships exist. For example, Purvis et al. (2001) selected a technology subject to knowledge barriers to model the impact of variables related to organizational learning under the presumption that the effects of these variables are more pertinent in the presence of knowledge barriers. and real options perspectives. However, most of these factors also increase either the variance of returns or managerial flexibility and so are posited to have an especially strong impact from the options perspective. In addition, four factors have predictions that run counter to those of the traditional view. More specifically, radicalness, strategic importance, and contributions to exploitable absorptive capacity are posited to have a positive relationship with adoption in the options model but no clear relationship with adoption in traditional models. Knowledge barriers, which have an unambiguously negative relationship in traditional models, are posited to have a mixed relationship in the options model. This suggests that future work could use these variables to examine which view represents a more accurate picture of technology adoption. For now, it is worth noting that the options lens provides an explanation for what would otherwise seem to be a surprising lack of aversion to (or even a preference for) more radical IT platform solutions. There seems to be little evidence that comparative radicalness slowed the rate of adoption of such initially popular innovations as expert systems, CASE tools, or object-oriented programming.
The track record for implementation of these sorts of IT innovations, however, is another matter. While the focus here has been on adoption, it is worth pausing to consider the implications of real options for the likelihood of full implementation given adoption. In both the traditional view and the options view, an increase in the expected value of returns should increase the likelihood of full implementation. In the former case, adoption is expected to always include the full implementation, while in the latter case an increase in expected returns increases the chance that the option to implement will actually be exercised. However, when the variance of returns or managerial flexibility is high, the situation becomes more complex. An increase in these variables increases the chance that an option will be created (i.e., provisional adoption will occur) but does not increase the chance that the option will actually be exercised. As a general rule, organizations employing the options approach will be more prone to initiate adoption projects but also more prone to terminate them. 15 In fact, the greater the difference in traditional and options estimates of value, the less likely it is that implementation will follow adoption, and so the more likely it is that a large assimilation gap will be observed at the level of the population (Fichman and Kemerer 1999) . Interestingly, the difference between traditional and options estimates of value will be particularly high when technologies impose high knowledge barriers and have greater susceptibility to network externalities, and this is consistent with prior (albeit more informal) theorizing on the circumstances leading to large assimilation gaps (Fichman and Kemerer 1999) .
Real Options Valuation
The model also holds implications for estimating the value of IT platforms. To date, leading research has focused primarily on developing quantitative tools that are most rigorous from a finance perspective.
That is an admirable goal and should certainly be pursued going forward, but to rephrase Einstein's aphorism on simplicity, 16 everything should be made as precise as possible but not more so. There will be circumstances where options thinking applies quite well but where the embedded options resist precise quantification, due to high levels of ambiguity and equivocality surrounding the impact of these options on the firm and its competitive environment. As Taudes et al. (2000) note in explaining managerial resistance to traditional NPV models, it is entirely appropriate for managers to balk at expending the effort to estimate a model known to be a poor representation of reality. While the use of formal OPMs can improve on traditional quantitative valuation models, there will still be circumstances where any primarily quantitative model will require too many assumptions or simplifications to present an informative picture of the value of a project. In such circumstances, it would be unfortunate if practitioners were to fall back on unguided managerial intuition rather than seek to apply the logic of real options in a systematic but qualitative fashion.
The model presented here could be used to help develop a qualitative options valuation instrument, suggest better quality of implementation, i.e., fewer instances of missed opportunities or over-commitment to failing efforts.
as McGrath and MacMillian (2000) have developed for the case of R&D and new product development. With this approach, managers assess option value by indicating their extent of agreement or disagreement with several statements, each of which articulates some element that tends to increase or decrease the option value of a project. For example, to evaluate the prospects for network dominance of a technology instance, managers could be asked to assess (say, on a 10-point scale) whether a vendor has control over an installed base, strong intellectual property rights, strength in complements, etc. The scores on the individual statements, when aggregated, could provide an initial assessment of the contribution of this one factor to the option value of a project. A similar exercise could be used for the other 11 factors. While the particulars of emerging IT platforms differ from R&D projects, the structure of the problem is sufficiently similar to encourage this approach.
Even when a formal OPM is to be used, a systematic qualitative evaluation could still play an important role. Such an analysis could help managers to structure a project to maximize the potential for high option value even before the actual attempt to estimate the model is undertaken. (Such "amplifying" actions are further discussed in the next section.) Then, during the estimation process, the qualitative evaluation could help managers structure the options frame and identify reasonable bounds on options model parameters for different options. Regarding the former, as Amram and Kulatilaka (1999) note, it is difficult to capture more than three or four sources of uncertainty in an OPM; the model introduced here could help managers determine the most important sources of uncertainty to capture. Regarding the latter, the model helps to identify when there will be a particularly high variance of potential outcomes, which justifies relatively high values for parameters capturing the variance of expected payoffs. Finally, this model could help managers identify the most appropriate OPM to use. For example, when knowledge barriers are high and learning-related endowments are low, this suggests that the potential for a project to have a negative payoff is not trivial, and so an options model that permits the value of benefits to turn negative may be warranted.
In summary, the options model introduced here could support a systematic but qualitative evaluation of option value, which could be viewed as an end in itself or as the first step in a quantitative effort. In fact, one could imagine a triage process where a qualitative evaluation is used first to generate a rough picture of the option value of competing initiatives and then to assess the feasibility of quantification for each initiative. Then, when quantification is feasible, the results of the qualitative analysis could serve as one key input into the quantification process.
Project Management and Culture
While options thinking obviously changes how investments are evaluated, the impacts on project management (Hamilton 2000) and culture (McGrath 1999) in adopting organizations are equally far reaching. Organizations that evaluate investments according to the logic of real options but manage them according to traditional principles will be falling out of the pan of systematic undervaluation and into the fire of systematic overvaluation. Options thinking assumes that managers will exercise their discretion to reorient projects as they unfold and that this discretion will be well informed and dispassionate. Therefore, firms embracing options thinking should be more prone to initiate positioning investments in IT platforms, but they should also be more prone to cull options that, based on new information, are not worth exercising.
As a result, options thinking will mean putting new procedures in place and allocating resources to actively track the factors that affect option value. Beyond tracking, managers can also take conscious steps to amplify the option value associated with different factors (McGrath 1997) . This could mean seeking out application areas with high strategic importance and sustainability, locating innovation in areas with greater innovation-and learning-related endowments, biasing selection toward technologies and products with better prospects for dominance, and pursuing more incremental implementation strategies. In addition, options thinking means paying special attention to actions that dramatically increase the upside, so long as this does not have a major adverse effect on the expected value of payoffs. (A further discussion of tactics for structuring IT projects to enhance option value is available in Fichman et al. 2004.) Beyond implementing appropriate tools and processes, managers must develop a culture consistent with options thinking. Some elements of this culture include a greater willingness to take on risk at the onset of a project, an increased propensity to critically evaluate past decisions, and-perhaps most important-a commitment to resist branding terminated projects and the people associated with them as "failures" (McGrath 1999) . As the literature on IT project escalation shows, IT projects often take on a life of their own and can be difficult to terminate (Keil et al. 2000) . Many of the qualities we prize on the part of project team members-determination, positive thinking, personal responsibility for outcomeswork against the kind of dispassionate culling of projects indicated by options thinking. Furthermore, some elements of options thinking itself can reinforce project escalation (Keil and Flatto 1999) . For example, when estimated costs to complete a project have shifted significantly upward-but the potential for a very high upside potential nevertheless remains intact-the option value of continuing can remain highly positive despite the fact that the probability of an overall loss on the project has increased considerably. As a result, options thinking will require special attention to how managers can know when to terminate or redirect troubled projects. As Amram and Kulatilaka (1999) observe, "In general, to capture the value of real options, organizations must be more flexible, take more risks, start a lot more projects, and kill a lot of projects" (p. 210). In the end, options thinking is just a means to promote and properly value managerial flexibility in project execution; therefore, a company culture that encourages managers to recognize and exploit flexibility will get the greatest benefit from options thinking.
Summary and Conclusions
This article has developed the argument that positioning investments in IT platforms (such as pilot projects, prototypes, or the first phase in a multiphase implementation) create real options on the subsequent implementation and use of the platform. Based on this logic, a set of 12 factors-drawn from 4 comple-mentary perspectives on organizational innovationwere synthesized into a model of the option value. By assigning an important role to factors that increase the variance of returns and managerial flexibility, the model presents a distinctive analysis of the determinants of technology adoption.
The model developed here has two central implications for research and practice. First, in the domain of IT innovation research, the model could guide work investigating the determinants of early initiation and adoption of IT platforms. Because increased option value increases the returns to innovation, this suggests the factors leading to high option value should be predictive of early initiation and adoption. Second, in the domain of investment valuation, the model identifies a set of factors that drive the option value associated with IT platforms. When quantitative estimation is feasible, an evaluation of these factors could to help to direct managerial attention to the most promising options and could provide insights into the structuring of options and the estimation of actual model parameters. Alternatively, when quantification is not feasible, these factors could be used to support a systematic but qualitative method for valuing IT platform options. McGrath et al. (2004) note that "Real options reasoning is poised to occupy a central conceptual position in the development of theory that offers guidance for strategic decision making under uncertainty" (p. 86). Real options demand a different approach to IT platform valuation and management of ensuing implementations, so it is essential that researchers and practitioners be equipped to understand where real options are most warranted on theoretical grounds and which factors drive option value in innovative IT platform investments. While options researchers and innovation scholars both agree that real options are useful in understanding the adoption of emerging IT, the theoretical model developed here represents the first synthesis of work from real options and IT innovation.
